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Smnaary
:
Because of the importance of stock price volatility as an indicator
of risk, a number of studies have examined what causes price volatility
for individual stocks. Several studies that have examined the influence
of price level on volatility have derived conflicting results. This
study examines the impact of price level by examining the volatility of
a sample of stocks before and after a two-for-one split that assures
the stability of the risk for the two samples. The results consistently
indicated that the price level did make a difference—lower priced
shares were significantly more volatile than comparable higher priced
stocks
.
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PRICE VOLATILITY AND PRICE LEVEL*
Frank K. Reilly
Eugene F. Drzycimski**
INTRODUCTION
Because of the importance of stock price variability as an indicator
of risk, a number of studies have investigated what influences the vari-
ability in prices for alternative stocks. One factor that has been investi-
gated is the influence of price level, but the results have generated mixed
conclusions. Specifically, several authors have contended that stocks with
relatively low price levels are more volatile than comparable securities
with higher prices while other investigators have contended that price level
in and of itself should have no influence on price variability, because the
internal characteristics of the firm should be the determining factor. A
problem with all prior studies has been the requirement to hold risk con-
stant during an investigation. Specifically, the question arises whether
low price securities are also high risk securities and whether this risk
differential is what influences the results. The current study attempts
to solve this problem by considering the change in price volatility for a
sample of stocks before and after a two-for-one split. Specifically, we
examine the price variability for a group of stocks before they split and
*The authors ackknowledge the data collection and programming assis-
tance of Mohamed Djarraya, Rupinder Sidhu, and David Wright, and the use
of the computer facilities at the University of Illinois.
**The authors are Professors of Finance at the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign and the University of Wisconsin at Oshkosh respectively.
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the same sample of stocks during a period after the stock split. This
sample then should provide relatively constant risk during the two time
periods.
The first section discusses prior studies concerned with price vari-
ability and price level. In the second section we discuss the test design
and the hypothesis. Section three considers the test procedure including
the sample of stocks, and the sample time period. In the fourth section
the results are presented and discussed. The final section contains a con-
clusion and a discussion of the Implication of these results.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON PRICE AND VOLATILITY
The initial study on whether low-price stocks are more volatile than
high-price stocks was by Louis Fritzemeier. Fritzemeier analyzed fluc-
tuations, movements, and leads and lags of computed indexes of groups
of ten stocks falling within each of six price groups (under $10 to over
$100) taken from each of four lower grade (Ca, Caa, B, Ba) categories off
the NYSE as rated by Moody's for the 1926-1935 period. Both weekly and
monthly closing prices were indexed. Indexes were analyzed by a simple
plotting on logarithmic graph paper.
Fritzemeier felt that his study identified the following relationships
between stock price level and volatility:
1) Low-price stocks were more volatile than high-price stocks
2) Low-price stocks tend to outperform high-price stocks in both
bull and bear markets, and
3) Neither low-price nor high-price stocks seem to lead or lag the
general market movement.
Louis H. Fritzemeier, "Relative Price Fluctuations of Industrial
Stocks in Different Price Groups," Journal of Business , Vol. 9, No. 2
(April, 1936).

There were several methodological questions on the study. Specifi-
cally, stocks were grouped by prices rather than examining individual
stocks. Also, the sample was badly skewed toward high risk securities
and quality variables within grades were ignored. Finally, it was a
rather unique time period.
2
In 1951 John Clendenin challenged the Fritzmeier results. Using
monthly spot prices for an unspecified number of stocks Clendenin related
the range to the mean price for the period 1937-1944, the years 1946 and
1948, and November 1948. He concluded that the variability of stock price
was not a function of the level of price, but rather a function of stock
quality.
In 1966 Heins and Allison examined forty-eight A rated stocks and
sixty-two B rated stocks. They used the range/mean as a measure of vola-
tility and regressed it against average price, earnings variability, price-
earnings relative, trading turnover, and exchange listing for the year
1959. Because the coefficients for the average stock price variable were
very low the authors concluded that price variability was not related to
stock price. Unfortunately, the total multiple regression equation explained
little of the relative price variability. This may be because market per-
formance was ignored or because all micro factors contributing to risk were
assumed to be incorporated into the stock ratings.
2
John C. Clendenin, "Quality Versus Price As Factors Influencing Common
Stock Price Fluctuations," Jour.nal of Finance
,
Vol. 4, No. 5 (December, 1951),
pp. 398-405.
3
James A. Heins and Stephen L. Allison, "Some Factors Affecting Stock
Price Variability," Journal of Business , Vol. 39, No. 1 (January, 1966),
pp. 19-23.
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Altman and Schwartz recognized that the "volatility of price move-
ments" is ambiguous so they attempted a definition, studied the stability
of volatility over time, separated stock volatility into its unique and
market-related components, and into its long-run and short-run fluctu-
4
ations. Two basic price volatility models were formulated to examine
weekly closing prices for 20 stocks randomly selected from the S & P 500
for the period 1962-1968. Based upon their results, they cautioned against
trying to categorize stocks as either price-volatile or stable because
volatility measures are themselves volatile.
Subsequently, Haugen accepted the concept of differing price vari-
ability and attempted to identify characteristics unique to volatile
issues. It was hypothesized that price variability was an inverse
function of the spread between expected rate of growth in dividends and
the rate of return required by investors. The analysis examined 475
industrial companies during the 1948-1967 period. Frequency of stock
price observations was not specified. The dependent variable was defined
in two ways: the coefficient of variation of stock prices and the stan-
dard error of the regression of price on time divided by the mean price.
In both forms of the regression the mean price per share was a significant
determinant of price variability. Haugen concluded that the market for
common stocks is sufficiently imperfect to cause low-price stocks to trade
with more variability than high-price stocks all else being equal.
4
Edward I. Altman and Robert A. Schwartz, "Common Stock Price Vola-
tility: Measures and Patterns," Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis
,
Vol. 5, No. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 603-625.
Robert A. Haugen, "Expected Growth, Required Return, and the Vari-
ability of Stock Prices," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
,
Vol. 5, No. 4 (September, 1970), pp. 297-307.
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Because prior work indicated that more than fifty percent of price
variability stems from the firm effect, Klemkosky and Petty tried to
discern what causes price variability by applying multiple discriminant
analyses to numerous firm-unique variables. Thursday closing prices
for a sample of 160 industrial stocks traded on the NYSE for 1971 were
obtained. These stocks were grouped into quartiles according to price
variability as measured by their coefficients of variation. Various
investment data were gathered including measures of financial risk, fixed
charge coverage, growth in price and earnings, variability of earnings
and dividends, price relatives, dividend yield, supply of stock, stock
turnover, and the average price per share. Equivalent data for a hold-
out sample of ninety stocks was also gathered.
The results strongly supported the notion that low-price stocks are
more volatile than high-price stocks. Two variables, turnover and average
price, classify both samples about as well as did all eleven variables.
Clearly, prior studies have produced opposing results. Apparently
there is a possibility that a market imperfection exists which causes
low-price stocks to evidence greater volatility than high-price stocks.
TEST DESIGN AND HYPOTHESIS
Justification of Test Design
Prior studies have examined differences in the volatility for a sample
of stocks that had differences in price level, but also major differences
in risk. To pinpoint the effect of price level on volatility the general
Robert C. Klemkosky and William J. Petty, "A Multivariate Analysis
of Stock Prices," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Vol. 1,
No. 1 (Summer, 1973), pp. 1-10.
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approach was to include specific measures for other variables that might
effect price volatility and also a price level variable. The intent was
to hold these other variables constant (including risk), and determine if
price level had an independent effect. In our research design where we
examine price volatility before and after a stock split, all the "other
variables" are held constant because the basic nature of the company is
generally constant during the total test period of about one year. Obvious
examples of no change would be such variables as the debt/equity ratio,
fixed charge coverage, EPS volatility or growth, and the P/E ratio. None
of these characteristics should change because the companies are the same
and such variables typically do not fluctuate significantly during such a
short time interval.
Further, it is notable that the variables that might change during the
two test periods would favor a decline in price volatility. Specifically,
prior research has indicated that firms that split tend to increase their
dividend. Hence, one might expect an increase in the dividend yield after
the split. Several prior studies have indicated a negative relationship
between dividend yield and price volatility because of the predictability
g
of return from dividends as contrasted to price appreciation. Therefore,
this tendency toward an increase in dividend yield would favor a decline
in stock price volatility.
Eugene F. Fama, L. Fisher, M. Jensen, and R. Roll, "The Adjustment
of Stock Prices to New Information," International Economic Review , Vol.
10, No. 1 (February, 1969), pp. 1-21.
Q
Burton G. Malkiel, "Equity Yields, Growth, and the Structure of
Share Prices," The American Economic Review , Vol. 53, No. 5 (December,
1963), pp. 1004-1031.
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Several studies have likewise indicated a general negative relation-
ship between price volatility and the number of shares outstanding. One
may question whether shares outstanding is a proxy for size, but obviously
in the current study there has generally been a doubling of the number of
shares outstanding. Therefore, if there is a bias, it would be toward a
decline in volatility because of the significant increase in shares out-
standing.
Finally, annual trading turnover has consistently been shown to have
a significant effect on absolute price volatility and even relative volatil-
9ity (beta) . Specifically, studies have consistently found a significant
positive relationship between trading turnover and stock price volatility.
Our results indicated that although the absolute amount of trading in-
creased after the split, the trading did not increase by a factor of two.
Therefore, the relative amount of trading (i.e., trading turnover) did not
increase, but actually tended to decline slightly after a stock split.
This decline in trading turnover would tend to indicate the possibility
of a small decline in price volatility.
In summary, because of the test design almost all of the internal
risk characteristics of the sample firms are, by definition, constant so
should not influence the price volatility for the two samples of stocks.
The variables that do change (shares outstanding) , or could change (divi-
dend yield and trading turnover) , would favor a decline in price volatility.
9
Barr Rosenberg and James Guy, "Prediction of Beta from Investment
Fundamentals," Financial Analysts Journal , Vol. 32, No. 3 (May-June, 1976),
pp. 60-72.
The average trading during the 25 week pre-split period was 404.34;
the average during the post-split period was 653.08, an increase of 61.5
percent.
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Statement of Hypothesis
Based upon the belief in efficient capital markets and the prior
discussion of test design it is hypothesized that there will not be a
significant difference in the price volatility for the two samples of
stocks with significantly different price level . Put another way, it is
hypothesized that price level does not affect price volatility .
TEST PROCEDURE
Sample of Stocks
The sample is composed of a number of common stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange that split tvo-for-one during the period 1964-1976.
The t:wo-for-one split criteria was stipulated to ensure a major price
change. For each of the 13 years, ten stocks were randomly selected
from the list of stocks that split two-for-one. Therefore, the final
sample was 130 stocks. A list of the stocks for each year is available
from the authors.
Sample Period
The sample period for the analysis of each of the sample stocks was
specified to avoid as much as possible any abnormal price movements in-
volved in the split itself. Specifically, several studies have examined
price movements for split stocks for various periods immediately surrounding
the time of the split as a test of the efficient market. In the current
study we want to avoid this period immediately surrounding the split in
jChe average price for the sample during the last two weeks of the
pre-split period was $62.98; the average price during the first two weeks
of the post-split period was $31.60. This represents a difference of 49.8
percent.
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order to measure the "normal" price volatility of the stocks involved.
Some may feel that a longer period surrounding the split should have been
avoided and we might agree except for the offsetting problem of changing
risk. A major advantage of our sample is constant risk, but the longer
the time interval separating the pre- and post-split periods, the greater
the probability of a change in risk.
The pre-split analysis period begins two weeks prior to the week of
the announcement and extends for 25 weeks. The post-split period begins
five weeks after the week of the split (t+5) and extends for 25 weeks be-
beyond this to week t+30. The following schematic drawing indicates the
period of analysis.
Week of
Split
Pre-split
period
AW
-27
AW
-2
Post-split period
AW t+5 t+30
AW - Announcement Week
Measures of Stock Price Volatility
The price volatility is examined using the following measures of vari-
ability during the two time periods. The analysis examines the weekly
percent price change during each of the two 25 week periods.
1. Mean percent price change without sign
2. Standard deviation of the percent price change including sign
3. Standard deviation of the percent price change without sign
4. Semi-standard deviation of the percent price change
5. Mean absolute deviation from the mean price change
6. Mean absolute deviation from the median price change
7. The systematic risk relative to the aggregate market (beta)
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In addition to an absolute value for each measure, there is a relative
12
value for each of the first six measures—relative to the aggregate market.
Specifically, for each of the first six measures we computed a similar mea-
sure for the aggregate market, as represented by the S & P 500, for the same
time period and derive a ratio of the stock's volatility measure to the mar-
ket's volatility measure. Therefore, for each stock there are 13 volatility
measures for the pre-split period and 13 volatility measures for the post-
split period.
The first three measures are all relatively standard with the excep-
tion that in two instances the sign of the price change is ignored because
our prime concern is with the amount of price volatility not the direction
of change. The fourth measure is similar to the second and third except
that it only considers price changes below the mean based upon the belief
that these are the price changes of interest to risk averse investors—i.e.,
13downside risk is the relevant concern. ' The fifth and sixth measures
are prompted by the extensive literature that indicates that stock price
changes may not be normally distributed, and in fact may be part of a
14family of distributions with infinite variance. Given this possibility
12
It is not necessary to derive a relative measure for beta since it
is by definition a relative measure.
13
This measure is discussed and defined in, Harry M. Markowitz,
Portfolio Selection (New Yorks John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), Chapter 9;
and Jack C. Francis and Stephen H. Archer, Portfolio Analysis (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall Inc., 1971), pp. 14-16.
14
Benoit Mandelbrot, "The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices, ' The
Journal of Business , Vol. 36, No. 4 (October, 1963), pp. 394-419; and Benoit
Mandelbrot, "The Variation of Some Other Speculative Prices," The Journal of
Business , Vol. 40, No. 4 (October, 1967), pp. 393-413; Eugene F. Fama, "The
Behavior of Stock Market Prices," The Journal of Business , Vol. 38, No. 1
(January, 1965), pp. 39-105.
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mean absolute deviation measures have been suggested by Fama as meaningful.
The fifth measure calculates the absolute deviations from the mean, while
the sixth measure determines absolute deviations from the median which may
be a more acceptable measure of central tendency for a non-normal distri-
bution.
Comparisons of Variability
Given the calculations there will be 13 measures of volatility for
each of the 130 stocks for the pre-split period and the post-split period.
The analysis Initially considers what happened to each of the stocks for
each measure. Specifically, how many of the stocks experienced an increase
or decrease in volatility pre-split versus post-split for each of the 13
measures. Based upon the hypothesis, one would not expect any deviation
from half in the number that experience an increase or decrease.
In addition, there is an analysis of the total sample in terms of the
13 measures before and after the split. Given the characteristics of the
13 distributions there is a test of the hypothesis that the distributions
are similar before and after the split.
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
Individual Stocks
For each stock there was a ratio of the variability measure after
the split, to the variability measure before the split. A ratio greater
15
Bank Administration Institute, Measuring the Investment Performance
of Pension Funds for the Purpose of Inter-Fund Comparison (Part Ridge,
Illinois: Bank Administration Institute, 1968).
16
For a further discussion of this see, William F. Sharpe, "Mean-Absolute
Deviation Characteristic Lines for Securities and Portfolios," Management
Science , Vol. 18, No. 2 (October, 1971).
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than 1.0 means the variability for this stock based upon this measure
increased after the split. Table 1 contains the 13 variability measures
and the number of stocks where the variability increased and the number
where it decreased. Using s chi-square test there is an indication whether
the proportion is significantly different from 50 percent.
These results indicate that for all of the 13 measures a majority of
the stocks experienced an increase in volatility after the split . More
important, nine of the 13 d ifferences were statistically significant . This
would constitute evidence against the hypothesis of no change in volatility.
Regarding how many of the increases or decreases were significant* it
is generally not possible to determine significant differences for many of
the volatility measures because of the lack of formal tests. An intuitive
rule-of-thumb sight be that a change of 100 percent is significant which
is a ratio of 2.0 or more. Alternatively a decline of 50 percent might
be considered significant (i.e., a ratio of .5 or lower). The results
using these rules of thumb are contained in the last two columns of Table
1. Again, typically more stocks experienced significant increases than
significant declines, but none of the numbers are very large. On average
about 15 of 130 stocks experienced a significant increase.
It is possible to use an F-Test to determine if there is a signifi-
17
cant difference in the variance for two independent samples. Obviously
in the present study the samples are clearly not independent so the test
is not legitimate. Still, if such a test were appropriate the required
17
For a discussion of this test see, Ya-lun Chou, Statistical Analysis
,
2nd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975), pp. 325-327.
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ratio for a significant change would be approximately two (1.98). There-
fore, about 18 of the 130 changes in variance would have been considered
significant.
Table 2 contains the mean of the 130 company ratios for each of the
13 variables. As shown, all the average ratios are greater than one which
confirms the prior results that on average the increases were larger and
more frequent than the decreases. We tested whether these average ratios
are significantly larger than one and the test results are contained in
Table 2. As shown, all the average ratios except one (Beta) are signifi-
cantly greater than one. These results indicate that there is a signifi-
cant difference in the number of stocks that experienced an increase in
volatility, and a significant difference in the size of the Increase as
reflected in the ratio.
These overall results for individual stocks provide consistent evi-
dence against the hypothesis. Regarding the number of stocks experiencing
an increase in volatility versus a decrease, the results indicate a signifi-
cant difference between high and low priced stocks which would not support
the hypothesis. In addition, the average of all the ratios were larger than
one and almost all of them were significantly larger which indicates the
size of the increases were substantial on average compared to the declines.
Total Sample Results
Table 3 contains the characteristics of the 26 variable distributions.
The first 13 are the volatility measures before the split, the last 13 are
the same variables for after the split.
These data indicate a wide range of values for the variables and also
indicates that many of the distributions have significant positive skewness
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and kurtosis. The relative variability of the distributions as measured
by the coefficient of variation (CV) indicated that for all measures
except the distribution of betas the CV's were larger after the split
than before. All the skewness and kurtosis measures were smaller for the
pre-split distributions.
Comparisons of Means
Table 4 contains the results of a test of the means for the alter-
native distributions of volatility measures for the high and low priced
stocks. The hypothesis would imply no significant difference in the mean
volatility measures.
Notably, in 12 of the 13 comparisons the mean value for the distri-
bution of the volatility measure was larger after the split than before.
More important for the hypothesis, if the critical value was set at .05,
five of the means were significantly different for the high priced versus
the low priced securities. Increasing the critical value to .10 added
another measure.
In summary, the comparison of means likewise does not support the
hypothesis of equal volatility for high priced stocks versus low priced
stocks, but probably could not be considered strong evidence against the
hypothesis. Although most of the means were higher for the low priced
group, only five of the differences were statistically significant.
18
For a test of means with samples that are not independent see,
William L. Hays and Robert L. Winkler, Statistics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 425-430.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summary
Because of the Importance of stock price volatility to the measure-
ment of risk a number of studies have examined what factors influence the
variability for individual stocks. One particular factor, price level has
experienced a checkered career because the folklore has tended to suggest
that low priced stocks are more volatile in contrast to almost all economic
and financial theory that would suggest that price level adjusted for risk
differences should not have any effect on volatility.
To test the effect of price level on price volatility this study
examined the volatility for a number of stocks before and after a two-for-
one stock split. Such a research design provides a sample of stocks that
is ns.turally adjusted for risk differences. Based upon a belief in an
efficient capital market it was hypothesized that there should be no dif-
ference in the price volatility for the high priced stocks (before the
split:) and the low priced stocks (after the split)
.
The results "on balance" did not support the hypothesis of equal
price volatility for the two samples. Specifically, the number of stocks
that experienced increases in volatility was significantly larger than
50 percent. The ratios of the volatity measures for the low priced
versus high priced stocks indicated that the mean of the ratios for all
13 measures were above 1.0 which indicates that the volatility measures
were consistently higher for the low priced stocks. All the means except
one were significantly greater than one at the .05 level. Finally,
an analysis of the means for the 13 distributions of volatility measures
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showed that almost all of the means Increased for the low priced stocks,
but only five of the differences were statistically significant.
Conclusion
These study results support the notion that price level adjusted for
risk differences does affect the price volatility of common stocks.
Beyond the basic results, one should recall the observation that even
with the matched pair sampling there was a possible bias in favor of a
decrease in volatility because of an increase in the dividend yield, more
shares outstanding, and a decrease in trading turnover.
M/E/12
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF STOCKS THAT EXPERIENCED INCREASES
OR DECREASES IN VOLATILITY MEASURES
No . of No . of Significant No. 2.0 No . 0.5
Measure Increases Decreases Difference or above or below
Mean P.C. Change 83 47 Yes 15 3
S.D. w/o sign 80 50 Yes 18 5
S.D. with sign 84 46 Yes 18 4
Semi-Std. Dev. 84 46 Yes 17 4
MAD 1 (Mean) 82 48 Yes 19 2
MAD 2 (Median) 83 47 Yes 20 2
Beta 75 55 No 28 27
Rel. Mean Change 79 51 Yes 8 8
Rel. S.D. w/o sign 81 49 Yes 15 13
Rel. S.D. with sign 71 59 No 10 11
Rel. Semi S.D. 79 51 Yes 10 10
Rel. MAD 1 75 55 No 11 8
Rel. MAD 2 76 54 No 10 9

-18-
TABLE 2
RESULTS FOR TEST OF MEANS FROM DISTRIBUTIONS OF
RATIO FOR INDIVIDUAL STOCKS BEFORE AND AFTER SPLIT
Measure Mean Ratio Std. Dev. of Ratio T-Value
1. Mean Absolute Change 1.3358 0.7082 5.41
2. Std. Dev. w/o sign 1.4116 1.0518 4.46
3. Std. Dev. with sign 1.4567 1.3604 3.83
4. Semi-Std. Dev. 1.4449 1.3517 3.75
5. MAD 1 (Mean) 1.4492 1.2540 4.08
6. MAD 2 (Median) 1.4489 1.2560 4.07
7. Beta 2.0063 10.6894 1.07
8. Rel. Mean Abs. Change 1.1881 0.5434 3.95
9. Rel. Std. Dev. w/o sign 1.2569 0.8820 3.32
10. Rel. Std. Dev. with sign 1.2722 0.9714 3.19
11. Rel. Semi-Std. Dev. 1.2857 1.0074 3.23
12. Rel. MAD 1 1.2528 0.8503 3.39
13. Rel. MAD 2 1.2555 0.8479 3.44
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TABLE 4
RESULTS FOR THE TEST OF MEANS FROM DISTRIBUTIONS
OF VOLATILITY MEASURES BEFORE AND AFTER STOCK SPLIT
Measure
1. Mean Absolute Change
2. Std. Dev. w/o sign
3. Std., Dev. with sign
4. Semi-St. Dev.
5. MAD 1 (Mean)
6. MAD 2 (Median)
7. Beta
8. Rel. Mean Abs. Change
9. Rel. Std. Dev. w/o sign
10. Rel. Std. Dev. with sign
11. Rel. Semi-Std. Dev.
12. Rel. MAD 1
13. Rel. MAD 2
Mean Mean
Before Split After Split T-Value Probability
.0316 .0375 3.42* .001
.0281 .0312 1.66 .098
.0417 .0487 2.86* .007
.0281 .0318 2.02* .047
.0309 .0370 3.56* .001
.0304 .0364 3.59* .001
.9762 .9756 0.01 .992
2.497 2.690 1.40 .169
2.919 2.966 0.22 .826
2.621 2.804 1.08 .284
2.485 2.635 0.98 .331
2.535 2.716 1.19 .240
2.522 2.712 1.28 .204
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